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5INTERSECTIONS OF LAW 
AND COOPERATIVE GLOBAL 
CLIMATE GOVERNANCE:
CHALLENGES IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 
1. INTRODUCTION
After having once again attended the recent United Nations climate process at the eighteenth 
Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and the eighth Conference of Parties serving 
as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 
8) in Doha, Qatar last December, I wonder what the 
diplomatic value of such massive negotiations really is. In 
the last days of the conference, many had already seen 
the talks close to collapse and were wondering whether 
COP 18 would need to be reconvened in 2013. Only 
last-minute decisions lead to a finalisation of the rules for 
the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period and 
agreement on a work programme for the new negotiation 
track to deliver a new agreement by 2015.
Unfortunately, climate change is apparently not waiting 
for the slow timetables of diplomats. The Doha meeting 
took place at the end of a year (2012) of increasingly stark 
warnings both on paper and delivered by Mother Nature 
herself. The United States suffered from a record drought, 
foreshadowing the permanent dust bowl the US Midwest 
is probably going to be turned into by climate change. 
Hurricane Sandy submerged vast swaths of the US East 
Coast including New York. Arctic sea ice reached a new 
record low, 50 per cent below the long-term average. 
Shortly before the Doha conference the World Bank 
published a report warning of “cataclysmic consequences” 
if climate change was not reined in.1  And while the Doha 
conference was underway the Philippines were battered 
by “Bopha”, a typhoon of near-unprecedented strength 
that caused hundreds of deaths.
The “diagnosis” of planet earth seems rather clear in that 
constantly growing human and industrial activities have 
caused dramatically increased emissions of greenhouse 
gases, which in turn cause the global climate to change 
rapidly and probably irreversibly. The “symptoms” of 
climate change are likely to cause more and more natural 
disasters, extreme weather events and climate induced 
migration movements. All of these undesirable happenings 
can be considered as a threat against all aspects of 
human security with a potential to cause national and 
cross-boundary conflict and thus endanger global peace 
and security. The “therapy” against the symptoms of 
climate change is much less clear and will be discussed 
in this article. It is argued here that more coherence in 
the intersections of law and increased cooperative global 
climate governance should lead the way to cope with the 
challenges ahead, i.e. the challenges in the Anthropocene.
2. ANTHROPOCENE - THE AGE       
 OF MAN
The famous atmospheric chemist and Dutch Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen initially coined the term 
“anthropocene”. The term has ancient Greek roots: 
anthropo meaning “human” and cene meaning “new”. In 
2000 Crutzen realised that we live in an age primarily 
shaped by people. From their trawlers scraping the 
floors of the seas to their dams impounding sediment 
by the gigatonne, from their stripping of forests to their 
irrigation of farms, from their mile-deep mines to their 
melting of glaciers, humans were bringing about an age 
of planetary change. Crutzen suggested this age be called 
Anthropocene – “the age of man”.2
Mankind has now inhabited or visited almost all 
places on earth; even set foot on the moon – and the 
exploration continues. The expansion of mankind, both 
in numbers and per capita exploitation of the earth’s 
resources, has been astounding. During the past three 
centuries the world’s population increased tenfold to 7 
6billion, accompanied e.g. by a growth in cattle population 
to 1.500 billion. Urbanisation has increased tenfold in 
the past century. In only a little while we are deemed to 
exhaust the fossil fuels that were generated over millions 
of years. Thirty to fifty per cent of the land surface has 
been transformed by human action, and mankind uses 
more than half of all accessible fresh water. Considering 
these and many other major and still growing impacts of 
human activities on earth and atmosphere, it has become 
more than appropriate to emphasise the central role of 
mankind in geology, ecology and law by proposing the 
term “anthropocene” for the current historical epoch as 
we already know that the impact of human activities has 
and will have severe consequences for present and future 
generations.3
For the purpose of this article the human being is seen 
as the root of the problem, the subject of vulnerability 
that requires protection, the nucleus of the law and the 
target of cooperative global climate governance aiming 
at maintaining peace and security at the same time. The 
predominant challenges in the Anthropocene, especially 
in regard of climate change, will be briefly sketched below. 
Typologically significant of the Anthropocene these 
challenges must be seen related to the level of complexity, 
the degree of uncertainty and the novelty that actually 
surrounds climate change in a process that involves ever-
changing circumstances that can hardly be fully controlled. 
As a combination of legal and policy analysis this article 
shall also examine selected aspects of the framework of 
international law and governance in the field of climate 
change.
In 2011, Pope Benedict XVI addressed the German 
Bundestag illustrating the sources of law in nature and 
reason by making reference to the popular interest in 
ecology as a means of respecting nature: 
 Yet I would like to underline a point that seems to me to 
be neglected, today as in the past: there is also an ecol-
ogy of man. Man too has a nature that he must respect 
and that he cannot manipulate at will. Man is not merely 
self-creating freedom. Man does not create himself. He 
is intellect and will, but he is also nature, and his will is 
rightly ordered if he respects nature, listens to it and ac-
cepts himself for who he is, as one who did not create 
himself. In this way, and in no other, is true human free-
dom fulfilled.
In 2012, the Club of Rome launched a Report entitled 
“2052 – A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years”.4  In 
it, author Jorgen Randers tries to answer the question of 
what our world will look like in forty years’ time. Some of 
the findings include the following: 
 Humanity is in overshoot (mainly climate-related) and 
the landing will not be soft […]. Humanity has a forty-
year window to avoid the most serious negative conse-
quences of its decades-long overconsumption splurge. 
The process of adapting humanity to the planet’s limita-
tions may be too slow to stop planetary decline. Global 
population will grow, peaking at 8.1 billion people in 2042 
because of rapid decline in urban fertility. CO2 emissions 
will peak in 2030, because of a shift toward low-carbon 
sources of power and heat. Nevertheless, CO2 concen-
trations will grow, and the global average temperature 
will pass the danger threshold of +2 C by 2050, and peak 
at 2.8 C in 2080, which could trigger self-reinforcing “run-
away” warming with a possible collapse in the second half 
of the 21st century.5 
Translating the aforementioned statements into 
the context of the Anthropocene raises the following 
questions, among others: How many people will the 
planet be able to support in future? Will runaway climate 
change take hold? Where will the quality of life improve, 
and where will it decline? While the process of adapting 
humanity to the planet’s limitations has started, Randers 
rightfully holds that the “human response could be too 
slow”.6
2.1 CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL 
 DISASTERS
Natural disasters are on the increase in the Anthropocene and in this context climate 
change cannot be viewed in isolation. “Disaster” means 
a calamitous event or series of events resulting in 
widespread loss of life, great human suffering or distress, 
or large-scale material or environmental damage, thereby 
seriously disrupting the functioning of society.7  There 
is wide scientific consensus that the increased number 
and intensity of climate change induced natural disasters, 
such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions, tsunamis and 
hurricanes, is of alarming concern.8 Recent incidents 
include among others the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), 
Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy (2012), Typhoon 
Bopha in the Philippines (2012), and the earthquakes 
in Pakistan (2005), Haiti (2010) and Fukushima (2011). 
The World Bank in a report published in 2012 warned 
of “cataclysmic consequences” if climate change was not 
reined in.9
The 2012 Special Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for Managing the Risks 
of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation (SREX) demonstrates shockingly that 
the severity of the impacts of extreme and non-extreme 
weather and climate events depends strongly on the level 
of vulnerability and exposure to these events. Basic risks 
to which people are subjected by displacement include 
landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalisation, 
7food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to 
common property resources, and social disarticulation. 
Particular groups and conditions have been identified as 
having differential exposure or vulnerability to extreme 
events; for example race/ethnicity, socioeconomic class 
and caste, gender, age (both the elderly and children), 
migration, and housing tenure (whether renter or 
owner) are among the most common social vulnerability 
characteristics.10  “During the period from 1970 to 2008, 
over 95% of deaths from natural disasters occurred in 
developing countries.”11
The increase of natural disasters also poses challenges 
for international law and the international governance 
framework, especially when it comes to coordination, 
disaster relief and international cooperation. The 
international community, even if willing, is not easily able 
to provide relief to disaster victims. The duty to provide 
relief is largely incumbent upon the state within whose 
territory and jurisdiction the disaster occurs. This problem 
is rooted in the notion of state sovereignty, one of the 
most defining principles of international law.12
An increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases in 
the atmosphere heightens the possibility that mechanisms 
that could lead to catastrophic or extreme climate change 
will be triggered, notwithstanding with the fact that there is 
uncertainty as to when and how exactly such mechanisms 
will be triggered. Not reducing GHG emissions, however, 
means subjecting future generations to the risk of severe 
harm.13 Considering the dangers related to natural 
disasters and the extremity of the risks involved for future 
generations, there is in fact no right to presuppose that the 
effects of climate change will be far from catastrophic.14  In 
other words, “postponing emissions cuts is in some ways 
like putting a revolver to future people’s heads and hoping 
that there is no bullet in the chamber”.15  From the point 
of view of justice, it has been stated that
 the nature of [climate change catastrophes] requires us to 
take drastic precautions against further [climate change] 
that could lead us to pass the tipping points that cause 
them. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that we 
are in a state of strong uncertainty with respect to these 
events; indeed, our strong uncertainty with respect to 
them – given their nature – makes the case for action to 
prevent them even more persuasive.16
To develop global strategies leading to sustainability 
of ecosystems against human induced impacts will be 
one of the greatest tasks of mankind, requiring new and 
intensive research efforts that will pose many challenges 
to international law and global governance. Dealing with a 
global problem like climate change will require a strong legal 
framework embedded in more effective global institutions 
in future. International law and global governance – 
traditionally viewed as separate academic disciplines, i.e. 
law, politics and social sciences – need to become part of 
a more integrated, coherent, interdisciplinary and holistic 
interplay, where international law and global governance 
eventually manage to get a grip on the arguably most 
significant challenge of our time – climate change.
2.2. CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN 
 SECURITY
The protection of the vital core of human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human 
fulfilment is at the core of the concept of human security. 
Providing human security means protecting individuals 
and the community from violent conflicts and from denial 
of civil liberties and to ensure freedom of expression and 
belief. It also encompasses the idea of satisfying the basic 
needs of individuals for food, shelter and clothing.17
Climate change has the potential to impose additional 
pressures on the various aspects of human security. 
Interrelating issues between climate change and human 
security include water stress, land use and food security, 
health security, and environmentally induced migration 
amongst others. Adverse climate events not only 
deepen poverty vulnerability in developing countries,18 
they impact on all aspects of human security, either 
directly or indirectly. The impacts of climate change on 
the agricultural sector are probably of most direct and 
profound nature. Impacts of climate change, droughts and 
floods in particular, will have an impact on food availability, 
food access and nutrient access.19
The ultimate damages of climate change may significantly 
affect economic growth.20 Climate extremes exert 
substantial stress on low-income populations in particular. 
The poor are most vulnerable to multiple dimensions 
of climate change such as heat waves, sea level rise, the 
destruction of coastal zones and water shortages due to 
drought.21  Health security is another important aspect 
of human security endangered by the impacts of climate 
change and the effects on health will exacerbate inequities 
between rich and poor. 22 Africa is particularly vulnerable in 
this regard as threats to health security are usually greater 
for poor people in rural areas, particularly children, due 
to malnutrition and insufficient access to health services, 
clean water and other basic necessities. Major killer 
diseases such as malaria expand their coverage as a result 
of global warming. Global and regional climatic variability 
enhances the risk of a further spread of other infectious 
diseases such cholera,23  dengue fever,24  and meningitis.25
82.3 CLIMATE CHANGE, CONFLICT AND 
 MIGRATION
The impacts of climate change on violent conflicts and changing migration patterns are further aspects 
related to the aforementioned concept of human 
security, and again with particular relevance on the African 
continent. While violent conflict can be seen as a driver 
of vulnerability to climate change, migration is a stressor 
that increases vulnerability to climate change. The linkage 
between climate related environmental variability and 
conflict has attracted much attention and debate.26  Yet, 
in 2011 Achim Steiner, Executive Director of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), asserted that 
climate change is a “threat multiplier” that has fundamental 
implications for weather, settlements, infrastructure, food 
insecurity, livelihoods and development. Competition over 
scarce water and land, exacerbated by regional changes in 
climate, was already a key factor in local conflicts in Darfur, 
the Central African Republic, northern Kenya and Chad.27 
Climate induced migration28 is an aspect closely related 
to the concept of human security.29  Notwithstanding the 
fact that there is no certainty as to what exactly climate 
change will mean for migration patterns, there seems to 
be consensus that climate change will over time lead to 
population movements. Migration can be an adaptation 
strategy and can enhance adaptive capacity30  People 
migrate either temporarily or permanently, within 
their country or across borders, and many have an 
environmental signal in their reason for migration. The 
African continent31  and small island nations around the 
globe are most likely to be among those who will produce 
the most climate migrants in future. The total number 
of displaced people in Africa increased from 697,066 in 
2008 to 1,7 million in 2010.32  
The causes for displacement and migration are manifold; 
however, climate change is one of the interlinking issues. 
Potential drivers of migration are push and pull factors 
related to the region or country of origin or destination 
respectively, and intervening factors that facilitate or 
restrict migration, all of which may interact in different 
ways.33  The available evidence suggests that, globally, the 
large majority of people displaced by disasters caused by 
sudden-onset hazards (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, 
etc.) remain temporarily and internally displaced with 
people returning home to rebuild their homes and lives.34 
This might be different in the case of slow-onset disasters 
such as droughts and sea level rise with increasing cross-
border movement of a permanent nature.35  
3. INTERSECTIONS OF LAW
The aforementioned scenarios have surely attracted the reader’s concern. In order to address this 
concern, it is necessary to call for effective regulation 
in order to prevent the worst case. In this context the 
law comes in: “Law is the major instrument by which 
mature societies consolidate their internal and external 
relationships” and “without legal rules, the life of a society 
becomes unpredictable and aleatory.”36  For good reason, 
there is no clearly defined term, nor a marked branch 
of the law, which would cover all legal implications of 
climate change. Subsummising climate change under any 
legal structure is a challenging task due to the endless 
ramifications of climate change and particularly due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of climate change and its impacts 
on various segments of our planet. Climate change can 
therefore only be tackled through a combination of 
political, legal and natural science tools. Climate change, 
biodiversity loss, the marine environment, ozone 
depletion, genetic resources, intellectual property issues, 
international trade and human rights – among others – are 
strongly interrelated. There are numerous intersections of 
law that occur when climate change is looked at from 
a legal perspective. Efforts to curb climate change have 
given rise to the evolution of some new principles and 
concepts of international law, including among others the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
the notion of common concern of humankind and the 
need for protection of the most vulnerable.37 
Climate change permeates the law in many ways, 
creating intersections of law in its diverse fields. If one 
would brand a new discipline “climate change law”, this 
would be both international and domestic in nature 
and include (at least) two complementary dimensions: 
procedural and substantive. 
The procedural dimension is related to the right to 
information, the right to participate in decision-making, 
and the right of access to justice. Climate change opens a 
multitude of challenges of a procedural nature. To what 
extent these challenges are relevant depends on the 
following aspects, among others: The question of whether 
and under what conditions an individual, organisation 
or state has the right to commence action needs to be 
addressed. The issue of locus standi is of great relevance in 
respect of judicial enforcement, which still needs specific 
attention. So far public interest litigation is scarce. Yet it 
seems to be most suitable in the context of climate change. 
Another focal point deals with the question of who would 
be the proper addressee of claims relating to climate 
change damages, and whether a right to environment 
is to be enforced vertically between individuals and/or 
horizontally between individuals and states. Moreover, the 
9question of enforcement at the national or international 
level is of particular interest in the globalising world, where 
the climate knows no boundaries. In the ICJ judgment in 
the so-called Pulp Mills case the Court for instance held 
as follows:38
 
 [T]here are situations in which the parties’ intent upon 
conclusion of the treaty was, or may be presumed to 
have been, to give the terms used – or some of them – a 
meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed 
once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among 
other things, developments in international law. 
The substantive dimension of climate change law is far 
reaching and incorporates among others constitutional 
law, administrative law, environmental law, water law, 
criminal law, the law of nuisance, the law of delict, 
insurance law and even tax law. On a vertical level, 
intersections of law occur on a very broad scale of the 
different but interrelated branches of the law with the 
underlying assumption that climate change law consists of 
the sum of legal provisions protecting the climate itself and 
those that protect the climate from the negative effects of 
climate change. This scale ranges from environmental law 
(with its multiple sub-branches such as biodiversity law, 
environmentally relevant provisions within the law of the 
sea, outer space law, energy and mining law, and specific 
legal instruments relating to climate change, etc.) to 
human rights law, humanitarian law, trade and investment 
law, the law on the use of force, criminal law, and liability 
law among others.39
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On a horizontal level, climate change law intersections 
can be found at the different levels of international and 
national law. The horizontal level entails international law40 
with multilateral agreements on the global, regional and 
sub-regional level, bilateral (and unilateral) agreements, 
general principles of law, customary international law, case 
law, and other instruments such as declarations, agendas 
among others. National law may consist of constitutional 
law, statutory law, common law, case law, customary law, 
policies, strategies and action plans and other relevant 
instruments. Climate related 
 
 policies are for instance central to the development of 
sustainable energy generation and markets. Laws govern-
ing sustainable energy development and supply cut across 
many sectors such as mining, forestry, agriculture, envi-
ronment, water, industry, electricity, and petroleum, and 
hence require coordination – a complex challenge that is 
not easily overcome.41 
Intersections not only occur with regard to the question 
whether it is national or international law that applies, 
or both, but also within the categories of national or 
international law themselves. A further problem is the 
demarcation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law. Some of the 
sources of national and international law are obligatory; 
others are of a non-binding nature. In the climate change 
context, the lack of globally applicable enforceable legal 
obligations is without doubt one of the major deficiencies42 
and one of the major subjects of and challenges for current 
climate change negotiations.
Furthermore, there has been an emergence of global 
administrative law forming trans-governmental regulation 
and administration in such fields as: 
 security, the conditions on development and financial as-
sistance, environmental protection, banking and financial 
regulation, law enforcement, telecommunications, trade 
in products and services, intellectual property, labour 
standards, and cross-border movement of populations, 
including refugees. Increasingly, these consequences can-
not be addressed effectively by isolated national regula-
tory and administrative measures.43 
Summarising it can be stated that cross-cutting themes 
thus include, among others, the relationship between 
international environmental law and general principles of 
international law; conflicts among differing legal regimes; 
the range of approaches to the regulation of activities 
within and beyond areas under national jurisdiction; 
the role and impact of competing state interests in the 
negotiation and enforcement of international regimes; the 
challenge of regulating in the face of scientific uncertainty; 
the role of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law in addressing the global 
problem; and the potential contribution of the judiciary 
and international tribunals in the further development of 
climate change law.
The intersections of international climate change law 
and multiple overlapping regulatory bodies reflect the 
fragmentation of global climate change governance in the 
absence of a universal climate change regime. This makes 
international climate change law extremely complex and 
global climate governance not very orchestrated. This 
overlapping complexity in the different climate change 
(related) regimes can be observed in various United 
Nations conventions, the international human rights 
regime, the world trade order (WTO), multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) and other international 
legal instruments that (directly or indirectly) deal with 
climate change, such as the Vienna Convention on Ozone 
Depletion, the Montreal Protocol,44  the Convention 
on Biodiversity, the London Dumping Convention, 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), the RAMSAR 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 
and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory 
Species of Wild Animals, among others. Same applies for 
geo-engineering, nuclear technology, intellectual property, 
international investment and finance regimes.45 
For the purpose of this article, the following sections 
shall only reflect on the climate regimes around the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), the work of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the role of the United 
Nations Security Council, the international human rights 
regime, international refugee law, the law of the sea 
regime (UNCLOS) and the world trade order (WTO).
3.1 THE UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION  
 ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE KYOTO  
 PROTOCOL46 
The international legal climate change regime is a product of international law, which has developed 
rapidly over the past few decades, especially since the 
dawn of the United Nations (UN), when rules and norms 
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regulating activities carried on outside the legal boundaries 
of nations were developed. Numerous international 
agreements – bilateral, regional or multilateral – have 
been concluded and international customary rules, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, have been 
established. International agreements are binding upon 
states if the consent to be a party to them is expressed 
by a signature followed by ratification, or by accession, 
where the state is not a signatory to a treaty, or by 
declaration of succession to a treaty concluded before 
such a state existed. The sources of international law 
in general are listed in Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial 
organ of the United Nations. However, considering that 
Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ was first drafted in 
1920, these provisions no longer reflect all the sources of 
today’s international law. New developments in respect 
of sources of law have to be considered in addition to 
those recognised in Article 38.
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
reaffirmed the Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, adopted in 
Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972, seeking to build upon it with 
the goal of establishing a new and equitable global order 
through the creation of new levels of cooperation among 
states, key sectors of societies and people, working towards 
international agreements which respect the interests of 
all and protect the integrity of the global environmental 
and developmental system, recognising the integral and 
interdependent nature of the earth. It proclaims first 
and foremost that human beings are at the centre of 
concerns over sustainable development. They are entitled 
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature 
(Principle 1). Moreover, states have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles 
of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other states or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (Principle 
2). Thirdly, the right to development must be fulfilled so 
as to equitably meet developmental and environmental 
needs of present and future generations (Principle 3).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol are ‘treaties’ 
in terms of international law and Article 2.1(a) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. International 
oversight and implementation of the climate regimes 
are only possible through an array of institutions under 
the UNFCCC and Kyoto regimes.47  The Conference of 
Parties (COP) is the supreme body of UNFCCC, which 
regularly reviews the implementation of the Convention 
and any related legal instruments that the COP may 
adopt to promote the effective implementation of the 
Convention.
The mandate of the COP to amend the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol, or adopt a new legal instrument 
that either supplements or replaces the Kyoto Protocol, 
is broadly limited by the UNFCCC’s objective and guiding 
principles. The UNFCCC, however, only provides a general 
framework to combat climate change. Parties have a 
responsibility to protect the climate system in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.48 
The UNFCCC allows for the introduction of protocols 
to the Convention. The first of these is the Kyoto Protocol. 
This agreement came into force on 16 February 2005. A 
number of global initiatives are being implemented to assist 
in the operationalisation of the UNFCCC. For example, the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) serves as an operating 
entity of the UNFCCC financial mechanism and has been 
supporting the national capacity self-assessment process 
at national level for some time. This is aimed at providing 
countries with an opportunity to articulate their own 
capacity needs in implementing the UNFCCC, the other 
two Rio Conventions and other non-Rio Conventions 
(e.g. chemicals). The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is 
to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations “at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate”.49  Such a level – and this is generally 
regarded by developing countries as an integral part of the 
aforementioned objective – should be reached within a 
timeframe, which allows ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change while guaranteeing that food production is 
not at risk and that development occurs in a sustainable 
manner. 
The Convention is a framework document, identifying 
two major areas of action required to address climate 
change, namely mitigation50  and adaptation.51  Moreover, 
the Convention as a legal instrument identifies a wide 
range of measures (see, e.g., the diversity of measures 
in Article 4.1) to address climate change through other 
activities such as scientific and technical cooperation, 
technology transfer, finance etc. The UNFCCC allows 
any state to become a party, and as at 2011 has 194 
signatories, making it a global instrument. Within this 
framework of global participation, actual obligations of 
parties differ substantially between industrialised and 
developing countries. The UNFCCC enshrines a number 
of key principles (Article 3) including the principles of 
“equity” and “common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities”. Today’s accumulated 
greenhouse gas emissions originate mainly from over 
150 years of carbon-based industrial activity in developed 
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states. Therefore UNFCCC recognises that all countries 
have a common responsibility to tackle climate change, 
but places a heavier burden on industrialised states to fulfil 
their historic responsibility of addressing climate change.52 
These principles are reflected in the obligations 
established for developed and developing countries in 
the Convention, including those relating to mitigation, 
adaptation, technology transfer, finance as well as 
communication of information relating to the Convention. 
The Convention goes further to make provision for 
countries in special situations, including particularly 
vulnerable countries, least-developed countries and 
countries undergoing transition to a market economy. 
Article 4(4) UNFCCC, for instance, states: 
 The developed country parties […] shall assist the devel-
oping country parties that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of 
adaptation to those adverse effects.
The Kyoto Protocol came into force in 2005 and shares 
the objectives and the institutions of the UNFCCC. The 
major distinction between the two is that while the 
UNFCCC only encourages industrialised countries to 
stabilise greenhouse gas emissions, the Kyoto Protocol 
obliges them to do so. Just like the UNFCCC, the 
Kyoto Protocol imposes a heavier burden on developed 
nations under the principle of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’. This group of countries must first and 
foremost take domestic action to address climate change, 
but the Kyoto Protocol allows them a certain degree of 
flexibility in satisfying their emissions commitments.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, actual emissions have to 
be monitored – each party must keep a national register 
to show measures carried out under the Kyoto Protocol 
instruments. The secretariat keeps an independent 
transaction log to verify that operations are consistent 
with the rules of the Kyoto Protocol. The most important 
aspect of the Kyoto Protocol is arguably the creation of 
an aggregate target for the developed countries (Article 
3) as well as legally binding and quantified individual 
targets set out in Annex B. It should also be noted that 
there are significant commitments for reporting, review, 
independent assessment and compliance (Articles 5, 7, 8 
and 18).
Under the adaptation objective, the Kyoto Protocol, like 
the UNFCCC, is designed to support countries in adapting 
to the inevitable effects of climate change and to facilitate 
the development of techniques that can help increase 
resilience to climate change impacts. An Adaptation Fund 
was set up to help with concrete adaptation projects in 
developing countries. The Adaptation Fund is a ‘solidarity 
fund’ in which a proportion of the revenue of CDM 
projects in developing countries is contributed to a fund 
to assist adaptation projects in other developing countries.
In the course of the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference held in Cancun, Mexico in 2010, a set of 
agreements were reached, building on the Bali Road 
Map53  and the Copenhagen Accord,54 which clearly 
reflect that the parties to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol had taken up the issue of climate justice. Three 
decisions have resulted from the Cancun Conference: 
one decision by the COP to the UNFCCC55  and two 
decisions by the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol.56  The reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions and the support for developing nations to 
deal with climate change are at the core of the Cancun 
agreements. In order to advance action regarding the aim 
of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in a mutually 
accountable way, national plans are formally captured 
at international level under the banner of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
Support for developing nations is provided for in the 
Cancun agreements and includes financial, technology and 
capacity-building support, which is to be realised through 
various mechanisms: nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions (NAMA); reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD+); the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM); the Cancun Adaptation Framework 
(CAF); the technology mechanism; and the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF).
At the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP 18) to the 
UNFCCC and the 8th Session of the COP serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties (MOP 8) to the Kyoto Protocol 
held in Doha, Qatar in 2012, a second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol has been launched, with 
2020 as the end date. Unfortunately, several countries 
that had previously participated in the Kyoto Protocol 
have not joined the second commitment period, such as 
Russia, Canada, New Zealand and Japan. Although it had 
been agreed to work towards a universal climate change 
agreement covering all countries from 2020 it will still be 
seen whether such agreement is to be adopted by 2015.
3.2. THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
 CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC)
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organisation (WMO) in 1988. The 
ultimate role of the IPCC is:
 
 to assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and trans-
parent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic 
information relevant to understanding the scientific basis 
of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential im-
pacts and options for adaptation and mitigation. Review 
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by experts and governments is an essential part of the 
IPCC process. The Panel does not conduct new research, 
monitor climate-related data or recommend policies. It is 
open to all member countries of WMO and UNEP.57
In the UNFCCC explicit reference is made to the IPCC 
under Article 21: 
 [T]he head of the interim secretariat referred to in para-
graph 1 above will cooperate closely with the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change to ensure that the 
Panel can respond to the need for objective scientific and 
technical advice. 
The IPCC was subsequently and repeatedly included 
in the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention where the 
methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change should be taken into account 
in formulating guidelines on verification of emission 
reductions.58 
The IPCC consists of three Working Groups: The IPCC 
Working Group I (WG I) assesses the physical scientific 
aspects of the climate system and climate change. The main 
topics assessed by WG I include: changes in greenhouse 
gases and aerosols in the atmosphere; observed changes 
in air, land and ocean temperatures, rainfall, glaciers and 
ice sheets, oceans and sea level; historical and paleo-
climatic perspectives on climate change; biogeochemistry, 
carbon cycle, gases and aerosols; satellite and other data; 
climate models; climate projections, causes and attribution 
of climate change.59  The WG I Technical Support Unit, 
which manages the organisational and administrative 
activities of the Working Group, is hosted by the University 
of Berne, Switzerland, and funded by the government of 
Switzerland.60 
The IPCC Working Group II (WG II) assesses the 
vulnerability of socio-economic and natural systems to 
climate change, negative and positive consequences 
of climate change, and options for adapting to it. It 
also considers the relationship between vulnerability, 
adaptation and sustainable development. Information is 
evaluated by sector (water resources; ecosystems; food 
and forests; coastal systems; industry; human health) and 
region (Africa; Asia; Australia and New Zealand; Europe; 
Latin America; North America; Polar Regions; Small 
Islands).61  In its reports, Working Group II elaborates 
on the scientific, technical, environmental, economic 
and social aspects of the vulnerability (sensitivity and 
adaptability) to climate change of, and the negative and 
positive consequences for, ecological systems, socio-
economic sectors and human health, with an emphasis 
on regional, sectoral and cross-sectoral issues. The WG 
II Technical Support Unit is housed at the Carnegie 
Institution for Science in Stanford, California, USA.62 
The IPCC Working Group III (WG III) assesses 
options for mitigating climate change through limiting 
or preventing greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing 
activities that remove them from the atmosphere. The 
main economic sectors are taken into account, both in 
a short-term and in a long-term perspective. The sectors 
include energy, transport, buildings, industry, agriculture, 
forestry, and waste management. WG III analyses 
the costs and benefits of the different approaches to 
mitigation, considering also the available instruments 
and policy measures. The approach is more and more 
solution oriented.63  The IPCC WG III Technical Support 
Unit is housed at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact 
Research in Potsdam, Germany.64 
The above three working groups were intended to: 
 draw on slightly different scientific constituencies, since 
impact and responses would require factoring in research 
outside the physical sciences and would touch on political 
issues. Working Group I would be dominated by climate 
scientists, while Working Groups II and III would have a 
wider participation, including, as time went on, by econo-
mists and other social scientists.65 
The historical 
 roots of IPCC’s strength reached very deep. Most people 
were scarcely aware that IPCC, and virtually every other 
international initiative […], relied on a key historical de-
velopment: The worldwide advance of democracy. It is 
too easy to overlook the obvious fact that international 
organizations govern themselves in a republican fashion, 
with vigorous free debate among all members and votes 
in councils of elite leaders.66  
Often, as in IPCC, decisions among the dozens or 
hundreds of elite leaders are made by a negotiated 
consensus in a spirit of equality, of mutual accommodation, 
and of commitment to the community process – all of 
which are seldom celebrated, but essential, components 
of the republican political culture.67 It has been said that 
it is 
 an important historical fact that such international re-
gimes have been created chiefly by governments that 
felt comfortable with such mechanisms at home, that is, 
democratic governments. Nations like Nazi Germany, 
Communist China, and the former SU did little to cre-
ate international organizations (aside from front groups 
under their own thumb), and often participated in them 
awkwardly. Happily, in the second half of the twentieth 
century, nations under democratic governance became 
globally predominant.68 
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That encouraged the proliferation of international 
institutions that were democratic, or at any rate elite-
based republican, exerting an ever stronger influence in 
world affairs.69  “The democratization of international 
relationships was the foundation upon which IPCC took its 
stand.”70  In 2007, the IPCC and Albert Arnold (Al) Gore Jr. 
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to 
build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-
made climate change and to lay the foundations for the 
measures that are needed to counteract such change”.71 
This Prize was most probably not awarded to the IPCC 
without good reason.72  Despite criticism it should not 
be forgotten that the IPCC is a very valuable institution 
that tries to help in an unprecedented way to resolve 
socio-political conflicts by gathering scientific knowledge 
and presenting it in a comprehensible manner. “The 
evidence shows the scientific consensus arrived at by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is 
a solid one, given the composition of the panel, and an 
innovative means of connecting science with politics.”73 
The 4th IPCC Assessment Report (AR4) – against all 
contrary opinions – can be considered a reliable study on 
the state of climate science and uncertainties in the year 
2007. Although two minor mistakes had been detected 
in the report of several thousand pages, the rest remains 
valid.74  The 5th IPCC Assessment Report (AR5) is 
expected to be published in 2014.75  For AR5 the IPCC 
has made it a priority to engage developing countries 
more fully:
 
 AR5 will be able to provide much greater regional detail 
than available literature has allowed in the past. We all 
have to make a major effort to do full justice to expecta-
tions in different parts of the world, and for this reason 
[…] we must take care of this aspect as diligently as pos-
sible. We would need to be equally diligent in going the 
extra mile in assessing literature in local languages where 
for scientific reasons we would be able to enrich the AR5 
with comprehensive knowledge and information.76 
The IPCC gives valuable advice to national governments 
and international organisations.77  By effectively and 
objectively assessing scientific knowledge and prevailing 
uncertainty, the IPCC provides the world with the best 
possible and much-needed evidence of climate change 
related impacts. Scientific authority also depends on 
reliable indicators.78  In this context the IPCC plays – no 
doubt – a decisive role in the policy reform and political 
decision-making process. 
 
 Because of its scientific and intergovernmental nature, the 
IPCC embodies a unique opportunity to provide rigorous 
and balanced scientific information to decision makers. By 
endorsing the IPCC reports, governments acknowledge 
the authority of their scientific content. The work of the 
organization is therefore policy-relevant and yet policy-
neutral, never policy-prescriptive.79  
The IPCC thus bridges the two fields, by getting the facts 
right so the policies may be effective. In effect, “if scientists 
cannot agree, political leaders and other stakeholders are 
unlikely to agree either.” 80
3.3 THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE 
 RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
Only recently UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made reference “to the gathering threat of climate 
change” at the Sorensen Distinguished Lecture on the 
United Nations at the Council on Foreign Relations. He 
said: 
 [S]cientists have long sounded the alarm. Top-ranking mil-
itary commanders and security experts have now joined 
the chorus. Yet the political class seems far behind […]. 
Too many leaders seem content to keep climate change 
at arm’s length, and in its policy silo. Too few grasp the 
need to bring the threat to the centre of global security.81 
Framing climate change more and more 
 as a security issue could serve to enhance and broaden 
the policy response at various governance levels by fa-
cilitating policy makers and their publics recognizing the 
common origins of what may otherwise appear as un-
connected phenomena. Debate about climate change is 
often couched in terms of a hypothetical future: by how 
much the temperature will rise, by how much countries 
should reduce their emissions, and the nightmare scenar-
ios that may come into play if they fail to do so.82  
This focus on what may appear a hypothetical future 
renders climate change a particularly daunting and 
difficult policy arena for governments because, as NATO 
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen explained:
 The science is not yet perfect. The effects are just starting 
to be visible, but it’s difficult to pin down what’s actually 
changing because of climate change. The timelines are 
not clear either. And as a politician, I know exactly what 
that means. When we have to choose between spending 
money now on schools or health care, or diverting funds 
to try to prevent something that will likely only hurt long 
after they have left office, the choice for most leaders is 
pretty clear. And, let me say, not hard to understand.83 
In 2011, the United Nations Security Council expressed 
concern that the possible adverse effects of climate 
change could, in the long run, aggravate certain existing 
threats to international peace and security and that 
the loss of territory in some states could have possible 
security implications.84  In a statement read out by the then 
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Council President, Peter Wittig of Germany, following 
a day-long debate on “maintenance of international 
peace and security: the impact of climate change”, he 
noted that “conflict analysis and contextual information” 
on, among others, the “possible security implications of 
climate change” was important when climate issues drove 
conflict, challenged implementation of Council mandates 
or endangered peace processes.85  
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who opened 
the aforementioned 2011 Council debate, pointed to 
the devastating impact of extreme weather and rising 
seas on lives, infrastructure and budgets — an “unholy 
brew” that could create dangerous security vacuums. 
“We must make no mistake. […] The facts are clear: 
climate change is real and accelerating in a dangerous 
manner,” he said, declaring that it “not only exacerbates 
threats to international peace and security; it is a threat 
to international peace and security”. Events in Pakistan, 
the Pacific islands, Western Europe, China and the Horn 
of Africa, among other areas, illustrated the urgency of 
the situation, he said. Worldwide, hundreds of millions 
of people were in danger of food and water shortages. 
Environmental refugees were “reshaping the human 
geography” of the planet.86 
Although the aforementioned statements clearly frame 
climate change as a potential source of conflict, a potential 
threat to national and international peace and human 
security, the future role of the UN Security Council with 
regard to climate change remains to be determined. The 
Council would arguably be acting within its legal powers if, 
for example, it passed resolutions requiring governments 
at all levels “to prioritize adaptation strategies in their 
planning and national governments to contribute military 
or other resources to a global disaster mitigation unit”.87 
Yet in 2011, as in 2007, the Security Council did not take 
a decision on climate change. This time, however, it did 
agree on a presidential statement, a non-legally binding 
document adopted by consensus, expressing concern 
that possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the 
long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international 
peace and security.88 
At present, the UN Security Council has only 15 
members – five of which are permanent and ten of which 
are members for two-year terms. Decisions on all but 
procedural matters are taken by an affirmative vote of 
nine members, including the concurring votes of the five 
permanent members.89  A cornerstone of the United 
Nations Charter paradigm is the notion of collective security 
which is perhaps the first and most obvious manifestation 
of the principle of solidarity in the post World War Il 
era.90  In fact, it forms the political and legal foundation 
for the collective security system established by the UN 
Charter. Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, member 
states “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council”.91  Article 39 stipulates that the Security 
Council can identify a “threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression” and “make recommendations, 
or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with 
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security”.92  Article 41 provides for the Council 
to decide on appropriate measures not involving the 
use of armed force,93  and Article 42 provides that if the 
Security Council considers that such measures “would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take 
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary 
to maintain or restore international peace and security”.94 
The Security Council can thus enforce its decisions made 
in response to a perceived “threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression” by use of force if it deems 
it necessary to do so. It is generally accepted among the 
international law community that it is at the Council’s 
political discretion to define what constitutes a threat to 
the peace for the purposes of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.95 
A still controversial manifestation of the notion of 
solidarity in international law is the emerging doctrine of 
the responsibility to protect. This concept was developed 
by the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty in September 2000, after the UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan emphasised the grave failure of the 
international community to handle gross and systematic 
violations of human rights such as those perpetrated in 
Rwanda and other areas.96  The aforementioned concept 
has gained growing attention in the context of the notion 
of global solidarity and collective security as it aims to 
address legal and political dilemmas for intervention to 
stop or pre-empt human suffering and crimes against 
humanity.97 
Under Article 52 of the UN Charter, regional 
organisations may undertake actions aimed at the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Article 
53 (I) of the UN Charter specifically provides that such 
regional organisations may undertake enforcement 
measures, provided that they have the authorisation of 
the UN Security Council. Most obviously the crux of the 
responsibility to protect concept is the dilemma of state 
sovereignty and intervention for humanity. In light of this, 
current discussions focus on the duty of the international 
community and the territorial state in cases of natural 
disasters, raising the question whether the doctrine of the 
responsibility to protect can actually be extended to the 
international law relating to disaster relief and in particular 
to cases of grave circumstances such as severe human 
suffering during times of natural disasters. Unfortunately, 
so far for international law and politics it still seems to make 
a big difference whether human suffering is the result of 
a natural disaster or of an (international) armed conflict.98  
However, when responding to the question whether the 
doctrine of the responsibility to protect should in future 
be extended to the international law relating to disaster 
relief one could argue with Achim Steiner as follows:
 There is no reason why the international community 
cannot avoid escalating conflicts, tensions and insecurity 
related to a changing climate if a deliberate, focused and 
collective response can be catalyzed that tackles the root 
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causes, scale, potential volatility and velocity of the chal-
lenges emerging. In bringing forward a response that en-
hances global security and cooperation on the climate 
challenge, the world can perhaps also better manage risk 
from numerous other challenges and in doing so dimin-
ish tensions between nations and lay the foundations and 
possibilities of a more sustainable and equitable peace.99 
It becomes apparent from the above that climate 
change is moving from mere politicisation towards a 
state of securitisation.100  Once an issue is successfully 
securitised it moves out of the sphere of normal politics 
to be dealt with as an emergency issue without the 
normal democratic processes being brought to bear, and 
the securitising actor can, through this process, infuse 
the concept of ‘security’ with any meaning desired.101  
Full securitisation would seem to be represented by the 
issue moving outside of the normal multilateral treaty 
framework used to manage political issues of mutual 
concern to the body with “primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security”: the 
United Nations Security Council.102 
Most obviously, the nature and “impacts of climate 
change challenge traditional notions in international law, 
most notably those relating to the principle of territorial 
sovereignty, with its presumptions of defined territory 
and fixed maritime boundaries”.103  “Sovereignty in 
the relations between States signifies independence. 
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the 
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other 
State,104 the functions of a State.”  The world is divided 
into clearly demarcated territories. Each territory has one 
government within the territory, with full jurisdiction over 
all persons and resources within its domain.105  In the 
context of climate change it seems appropriate, however, 
to explore whether the law of state responsibility offers a 
useful paradigm to address the problem.106  Unfortunately, 
however, national governments and statesmen more 
often than not regard themselves as 
 primarily responsible not vis-a-vis an existing global order, 
which they all too often violate, but vis-a-vis a possible 
future order, which they lack the will and vision to help 
bring about. This is the ultimate crime against peace and 
justice.107 
The UNFCCC and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol are 
an articulation of how states balance their sovereign right 
to follow their own development agenda with their overall 
responsibilities under international law, including those 
measures aimed at avoiding harm to areas beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction. This means that the global nature 
of climate change demands that states scale back some of 
their sovereignty by engaging in international cooperation 
and negotiation in the interest of the “common concern 
of humankind”.108 Efforts to curb climate change have 
given rise – sometimes in conjunction with developments 
in other environmental regimes – to the evolution of new 
principles and concepts of international law, including the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
the notion of common concern of humankind, protection 
of vulnerable countries and others.109  With regard to 
the application of the responsibility to protect doctrine 
to climate change it is argued here that existing relevant 
international obligations such as the responsibility to avoid 
trans-boundary harm must be seen in a broader context in 
order to widen the international responsibility to protect 
people and ecosystems at the same time.
3.4. CLIMATE CHANGE AND 
 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
As early as 1984, Karel Vasak in his inaugural lecture at the International Human Rights Institute in 
Strasbourg proposed the concept of solidarity or third 
generation rights, including the right to development, the 
right to peace and the right to a healthy environment.110 
Such rights
 
 are new in that they may both be invoked against the 
State and demanded of it; but above all (and herein lies 
their essential characteristic) they can be realized only 
through the concerted efforts of all the actors on the 
social scene: the individual, the State, public and private 
bodies and the international community.111 
The efforts that have been made so far to place rights 
at the centre of any future climate change dispensation 
have only recently started to become more human rights 
focused. One reason for the past silence of human rights 
regarding climate change is the fact that most international 
human rights instruments were drafted before the 
emergence of climate change as a common concern. 
However, silence is increasingly turning into salience. 
When looking at the most severe impacts of climate 
change such as drought, floods, migration and famines 
it becomes very clear that climate change and its effects 
affect large numbers of people and have an impact on a 
broad range of human rights; the right to life in the first 
place, but also the rights to health, adequate food and 
water, property and adequate housing, self-determination, 
to name only the most common and pressing ones. 
When it comes to the question of the state of fulfilment 
of human rights in the world, statistics are frequently 
consulted. Only some of the respective figures will be given 
as examples. This seems appropriate because the negative 
effects of climate change will most affect those people who 
already appear in one or more of the following figures. In 
developing regions, 24 per cent of people live on less than 
US$1.25 a day.112  Globally almost 870 million people (or 
one in eight) are chronically undernourished, of which 852 
million live in developing countries.113  The global under-
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five mortality rate is 45,2 per 1000 live births,114  63 in 
developing regions.115  One in nine people, or 780 million, 
lack access to an improved water source, 2.5 billion lack 
improved sanitation, and 3.4 million people die each year 
from a water related disease.116  Over a billion people 
lack adequate housing117  and about 1.5 billion have no 
access to electricity.118  Approximately 775 million adults 
are illiterate119  and around 215 million children are child 
labourers.120  
There are various reasons why a human rights based 
approach to climate change is gaining momentum with a 
high relevance for the future climate change debate. The 
most important one is probably the cross-fertilisation of 
human rights and climate change effects and the related 
mitigation and adaptation measures. With the threats 
climate change poses to human and environmental 
security, existing legal structures are likely to come under 
pressure.121  “[H]uman rights obligations may provide a 
legal baseline for how climate change is tackled and what 
must be protected from its impacts.”122 Human rights 
may serve as powerful tools for ensuring greater capacity 
to adapt to climate change.123 In order to design and 
implement a legal climate change regime that includes 
the policy value and the legal force of human rights it 
is required to introduce likely human rights impacts and 
outcomes of climate change.  The experiences gained in 
the field of human rights law may furthermore be useful 
sources of information in the processes of climate change 
related policy and legal drafting. Perhaps jurisprudence 
particularly related to the effects of climate change has 
not yet been established by international human rights 
tribunals. Jurisprudence by international human rights 
tribunals to address the impact of environmental harm124 
on human rights, however, may well be extended to 
also apply to the negative effects of climate change as 
global environmental harm.  Furthermore, climate change 
impacts on human rights should be considered when 
adaptation and mitigation measures are being developed 
and implemented. Tackling the negative effects of climate 
change may have a positive influence on the fulfilment 
of human rights. The less the negative effects of climate 
change, the better the chances to fully enjoy all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Moreover, international 
human rights law places certain duties on states (in very 
general terms, the duty to refrain from violating human 
rights itself, but also to protect its citizens from human 
rights violations) to address the effects of climate change 
on human rights, irrespective of their relative contributions 
of greenhouse gas emissions to global warming. 
In the context of climate change, three basic obligations 
of states can be identified, namely addressing the causes 
of climate change, i.e. mitigating climate change; addressing 
the effects of climate change, i.e. adapting to the effects 
of climate change by reducing risks created by climate 
change and vulnerabilities caused by it; and addressing 
the consequences of climate change, for example by 
protecting individuals displaced by the effects of climate 
change.125 
The duty to cooperate126  in the international protection 
of human rights by means of diplomacy, by institutional 
cooperation on the UN or regional level, or by imposing 
unilateral or multilateral sanctions to induce a state to 
comply with human rights obligations is a state obligation 
that could also apply to climate change related matters. 
To this end, the United Nations Human Rights Council 
adopted Resolution 19/33 in 2012, which 
 
 [u]rges States to take necessary measures to enhance bi-
lateral, regional and international cooperation aimed at 
addressing the adverse impact of consecutive and com-
pounded global crises, such as financial and economic cri-
ses, food crises, climate change and natural disasters, on 
the full enjoyment of human rights.127 
Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which 
together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) form part of the International Bill of Rights, call on 
state parties to take steps (legislative or other measures) to 
give effect to the rights contained therein. Both Covenants 
recognise the right of peoples to self-determination; both 
have provisions which prohibit all forms of discrimination 
in the exercise of human rights; and both have the force 
of law in the countries which have ratified them. Most of 
the rights and freedoms recognised in the ICCPR are also 
entrenched in national constitutions’ Bill of Rights. This 
may include, among others, the right to dignity, the right to 
life, the right to health, the right to water, the right to legal 
representation, the guarantee against torture and other 
cruel or inhumane treatment or punishment, and the right 
to protection against discrimination on any grounds. States 
have obligations under international human rights law to 
address disadvantage and threats to human rights and to 
ensure that policies aimed at limiting the effects of climate 
change are implemented effectively and in ways that do 
not overburden or discriminate against specific vulnerable 
groups, e.g. women, children and indigenous people.128  In 
2008, the UN General Assembly adopted, by consensus, 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, which will come into 
force on 5 May 2013129  and which provides a mechanism 
through which persons can petition the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights about violations 
of their rights.
One starting signal for addressing the linkages between 
climate change and human rights on the international level 
has been the United Nations Human Rights Council’s first 
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resolution on human rights and climate change in 2008.130 
In 2009, a number of countries called on the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) to conduct a detailed analytical study of the 
human rights dimension of climate change, taking into 
account the views of states and other stakeholders. This 
study131  was submitted to the tenth session of the Council 
held in 2009. In the same year, the Council adopted 
resolution 10/4 on human rights and climate change, which 
noted the effects of climate change on the enjoyment of 
human rights, and reaffirmed the potential of human rights 
obligations and commitments to inform and strengthen 
international and national policy making. The Council 
stated that climate change and human rights are governed 
by international regimes that have evolved separately, 
with different premises underlying the legal frameworks 
of multilateral environmental agreements (like the 
UNFCCC) and human rights treaties. In 2012, the Human 
Rights Council created a new mandate of an independent 
expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating 
to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment.132 The new independent expert will among 
other things serve to identify human rights challenges 
related to climate change.
It is not only within international human rights law that
climate change related issues are moving into the centre
of the debate. Also within the international climate
change negotiations human rights impacts have gradually
become a more relevant aspect.133  
In fact, 
 “climate change prompts significant questions about jus-
tice and distribution. There is an acute need for intelligent 
collective action focusing on the human suffering that cli-
mate change will cause in future. On the one hand, as a 
matter of law, the human rights of individuals need to be 
viewed in terms of state obligations: it is principally the 
state that is responsible for human rights fulfilment. On 
the other hand the assignation of such responsibility to 
only the state seems inadequate, especially in the context 
of climate change and human security.”134 
This is also reflected by more recent outcomes of COP 
to the UNFCCC. One remarkable statement in this regard 
is the emphasis made by Cancun Decision 1/CP.16135  on 
a human rights oriented approach to deal with all issues 
relating to climate change, by: 
 [r]ecognising that climate change represents an urgent 
and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and 
the planet, and thus requires to be urgently addressed by 
all Parties […]
and: 
[n]oting resolution 10/4 of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council on human rights and climate change, which rec-
ognizes that the adverse effects of climate change have a 
range of direct and indirect implications for the effective 
enjoyment of human rights and that the effects of climate 
change will be felt most acutely by those segments of 
the population that are already vulnerable owing to ge-
ography, gender, age, indigenous or minority status, or 
disability […]
Moreover, the Conference of the Parties:
 
 [e]mphasises that Parties should, in all climate change re-
lated actions, fully respect human rights.
The inclusions of human rights wording and concepts 
in the Cancun Agreements represents a unprecedented 
recognition of the fundamental link between human 
rights and climate change, and the first tangible results of 
years of patient analysis, advocacy and alliance building by 
communities vulnerable to climate change. Rights have 
become a relevant part of this discourse.136 
With all due respect for the importance of human rights 
law for the climate change related problems with which 
mankind is confronted, one should, however, not turn a 
blind eye to some of the challenges of international human 
rights law that might contribute to the disadvantage of those 
living in the regions most vulnerable to climate change, 
and particularly those segments of the population who are 
most vulnerable to the negative effects of climate change, 
namely women, children and indigenous people. Such 
challenges include insufficient enforcement mechanisms, 
the difficulty to establish extraterritorial responsibility and 
local accountability, the possibility of derogation from 
many human rights in times of emergency that may be 
declared in case of catastrophic events such as floods 
and droughts, or conflicting human rights, e.g. the human 
right to property or peaceful enjoyment of possessions to 
prevent or reduce action on climate change.137  
Several international human rights mechanisms are 
being used to drive action on climate change.138  Besides 
the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteurs and 
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, who 
conduct country missions, comment on country situations 
and receive human rights complaints, among other things, 
the Universal Periodic Review operating since 2008 under 
the umbrella of the Human Rights Council has become 
a useful mechanism for states particularly vulnerable to 
climate change to highlight the threats of global warming 
to people’s rights. Within the process of this peer review, 
the degree to which a UN member state is complying 
with international human rights law and domestic laws 
and commitments is being reviewed every four-and-a-half 
years by other UN member states. In the period from 
2008 to 2011, 31 states have raised climate change related 
concerns in the national reports and thereby at least 
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placed some moral pressure on high-emitting developed 
states.139 Reports by human rights treaty bodies will 
have “persuasive force insofar as the organs retain their 
independence, deliver reasoned and consistent opinions 
using accepted methods of treaty interpretation, and 
establish a pattten of compliance by State Parties”140
3.5. CLIMATE REFUGEE LAW?
In terms of international legal instruments, it must be stated that the issue of climate induced migration is only 
fragmentarily regulated. There is no single international 
agreement applicable and neither existing climate 
change law nor refugee law adequately provides for a 
consolidated legal framework. Voices asking for a stand-
alone international legal regime addressing climate change 
induced migration are becoming louder.141  The following 
two legal regimes and their scope of application show the 
difficulties for the international and African context.
The movement of persons across international borders 
due to climate change related events prompts several 
questions and challenges to international law. The Geneva 
Refugee Convention of 1951 defines a refugee as a person 
with a 
 well-founded fear of being prosecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his/her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his/her former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
unwilling to return to it.142  
Unfortunately this definition provides numerous 
complications in attempting to classify climate refugees as 
refugees under international refugee law. The scope of 
application of the Geneva Refugee Convention for climate 
refugees is questionable per se; in any case, it would 
only be applicable to those migrants who have crossed 
borders, as it does not provide for internal displacement. 
The legal distinction between those moving voluntarily 
(rather referred to as migrants) and those being forcibly 
displaced across borders (rather referred to as displaced 
persons) with the respective legal consequences does not 
adequately capture the reality of migration as an adaptation 
strategy, which cannot clearly be allocated under one of 
the two categories.143  Once a person has migrated across 
an international border because of climate change related 
events and does not qualify as refugee, the only set of legal 
norms that applies is international human rights law. A 
right to stay on foreign territory can only be “derived from 
the human rights prohibition of inhuman treatment – of 
forcible return of people to a country where they would 
be exposed to serious risks to life and health”,144  and 
international law is lacking a set of status rights, particularly 
for those migrating as a measure of adaptation to climate 
change.
New strategies and legal frameworks will have to be 
developed and negotiated to adequately address climate 
change related cross-border movement of persons. These 
should particularly encompass the following aspects:145 
1. Preventing displacement through disaster risk and vulner-
ability reduction and other adaptation measures;
2. Managing migration as adaptation measures;
3. Providing temporary protection status for persons displaced 
to other countries and permanent admission in cases 
where return turns out to be impermissible, impossible 
or cannot be reasonably be expected over time; and
4. Organizing resettlement/relocation for populations of low-
lying small island states and other states losing substantial 
amounts of their territory.
The issue of internal displacement has been taken up 
by the African Union by adopting the African Union 
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons in Africa in Kampala in 2009. As of 17 
January 2013, the Kampala Convention had 36 signatories, 
16 countries146  had ratified it and it has entered into 
force on 6 December 2012. It is the first regional legal 
instrument in the world containing legal obligations 
for states with regard to the protection and assistance 
of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The Kampala 
Convention defines IDPs as: 
 
 persons or groups of persons who have been forced or 
obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of ha-
bitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to 
avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of gener-
alized violence, violations of human rights or natural or 
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an in-
ternationally recognized State border.147  
The Convention explicitly recognises its relevance for 
climate change induced displacement, as it is states in 
Article 5 that “States Parties shall take measures to protect 
and assist persons who have been internally displaced due 
to natural or human made disasters, including climate 
change.” However, the Kampala Convention applies to all 
situations of internal displacement regardless of its causes 
(Article 15).
3.6. CLIMATE CHANGE, THE OCEANS AND  
 THE LAW OF THE SEA
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The intersection of climate change with the law of the sea cannot be denied. Where the impacts of 
climate change manifest themselves within the oceans 
arena sovereignty questions arise and have the potential to 
manifest themselves in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
The oceans cover more than 70 per cent of the earth’s 
surface and play a pivotal role in the climate change 
debate. On the one hand, the oceans must be seen as 
victims of climate change. Changes in ocean temperature 
and heat content, changes in ocean salinity, changes in 
sea level and biogeochemical changes (ocean acidification 
in particular) all have severe consequences, not only for 
marine ecosystems.148  The last Assessment Report of the 
IPCC (AR4) projected sea level rise to range from 0.18 to 
0.59 m (depending on the scenario) at the end of the 21st 
century (2090–2099).149  Primary contributors to global 
average sea level change are the expansion or contraction 
of the ocean due to changes in temperature and the 
transfer of water, particularly from glaciers and ice sheets. 
On the other hand, the oceans are also a part of the 
solution, playing a significant role in effectuating climate 
change impacts. The oceans are the largest sinks of CO2 
as well as the largest heat sinks. The oceans, by interacting 
with the atmosphere, create heat circulation and wind and 
weather patterns, which determine the impacts of climate 
change on all terrestrial life.150  The oceans absorb one 
quarter of human emissions of carbon dioxide annually,151 
acting to slow the rate of climate change.152 
The law of the sea is faced with considerable challenges 
regarding the impacts of climate change on the oceans.153 
Fields of international law that come to mind with regard 
to the effects of climate change on the oceans are 
international fisheries law and the broader field of marine 
environmental law. Furthermore, sea level rise and the 
opening of previously ice-covered ocean areas present 
navigational rules, the law pertaining to the protection 
of sensitive polar marine environments, but in particular 
international law relating to entitlement to maritime zones 
with a number of challenges. 
Besides a large set of international treaties governing 
various aspects of marine pollution154 and biodiversity 
protection,155  the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is the main international 
legal instrument in terms of marine governance.156  With 
165 parties,157  the Convention is a broadly applicable set 
of rules defining the rights and responsibilities of nations in 
their use of the world’s oceans and establishing guidelines 
for the environment and management of marine natural 
resources. However, it seems that UNCLOS does not 
provide sufficient rules to resolve the problems related to 
the effects that climate change has on the oceans.
UNCLOS III provides that states are entitled to four 
types of maritime zones: the territorial sea (which may not 
exceed 12 miles in breadth and over which the coastal 
state is sovereign); the contiguous zone (up to 24 miles 
in breadth, in which the state may exercise jurisdiction 
over customs, immigration and pollution); the exclusive 
economic zone (up to 200 miles, in which the state has 
exclusive rights to explore and exploit natural resources, 
establish artificial structures, conduct scientific research, 
and protect the marine environment); and the continental 
shelf (not exceeding 350 miles, in which the state 
possesses sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting the natural resources). Besides processes 
such as explosions or eruptions, climate change related 
changes of the oceans with sea level rise leading the way 
are further causes for shifts in coastal geography, which in 
turn directly impact maritime entitlements. It is presumably 
attributable to the lack of sufficient knowledge of climate 
change at the time when UNCLOS was concluded in 
1982, that the convention remains silent on whether 
baselines for maritime zones are ambulatory (i.e. whether 
maritime zones shift with the coastline) or fixed.158 
The threats of climate change and sea level rise present 
international law with massive legal challenges. Sea level 
rise rendering small islands uninhabitable is an extreme 
scenario, which is certainly not applicable to all small island 
nations. It, however, puts to the fore the effects of climate 
change on socio-economic conditions and bio-physical 
resources and many of the challenges with which the 
law of the sea (and many other fields including refugee 
law, human rights law, etc.)159 is confronted in the era of 
climate change. The options for small island states, which 
potentially lose statehood and maritime claims due to sea 
level rise, are increasingly being explored, on paper and 
in practice. One option to maintaining maritime zones 
and statehood, which has been suggested, realised and 
controversially discussed, not only from a legal point of 
view, is the construction of artificial islands.160  However, 
a solution to the legal problems of the consequences of 
climate change induced sea level rise at international level 
is not yet in sight. 
Lastly, new technology permits companies to exploit 
oil and gas reserves in the newly accessible continental 
shelf. Improvements in deep seabed mining technology 
make it feasible to extract rare earth and other minerals 
from the ocean floor outside of any nation’s jurisdiction. 
Newly available oil and gas exploration, shipping, tourism 
and fishing in the Arctic as a result of global warming has 
a variety of security implications in newly accessible Arctic 
sea routes as well as in other potentially contested sea 
lanes, i.e. in the South China Sea and in the Antarctic.
The high seas, one of the four global commons,161  have 
to be protected from environmental threats caused by 
deep-sea mining, overfishing, ocean warming, acidification 
and pollution. The protection of the high seas in terms 
21
of security threats, however, also plays an important role 
in the international trade arena. The United Nations 
International Maritime Organization estimates that over 
90 per cent of world trade are carried by sea.  The global 
network of merchant ships thus provides one of the most 
important modes of transportation.163  
Piracy may have serious implications for the continued 
economic development of many regions and is becoming 
a major challenge for international law. International law 
addresses the issue of piracy particularly in Articles 100–
107 and 110 of the UNCLOS. Article 101, UNCLOS 
provides that:
 piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of dep-
redation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and di-
rected:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place out-
side the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) or (b).
The welfare of seafarers and the security of navigation 
and commerce are at risk due to acts of piracy, which 
may result in the loss of life, physical harm or hostage-
taking of seafarers, significant disruptions to commerce 
and navigation, financial losses to ship-owners, increased 
insurance premiums and security costs, increased costs 
to consumers and producers, and damage to the marine 
environment. The Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law 
of the Sea has reported as follows: 
 
 In the first six months of 2012, 206 attacks were reported 
worldwide, compared with 316 attacks during the same 
period in 2011. The total number of acts or attempted 
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea worldwide, as 
reported to IMO in 2011, was 544, compared with 489 
in 2010.
 
 At the regional level, in 2011 IMO received 223 incident 
reports for East Africa; 63 for the Indian Ocean; 28 for 
the Arabian Sea; 113 for the South China Sea; 22 for the 
Straits of Malacca and Singapore; 29 for South America 
and the Caribbean; and 61 for West Africa.164 
Especially developing countries are increasingly building 
up their marine military forces to address current threats 
such as depletion of natural resources and hazards of 
maritime transport routes by piracy.165  As continuous 
economic growth can only be achieved if a safe passage 
of goods, raw materials and energy is warranted, defence 
budgets are being increased. 
China, for example, who transports 95 per cent of its 
imports and exports via the oceans, has increased its 
budget for armament by 216 per cent from 2000 to 2009, 
with upgrading the submarine fleet as a focus area. India, 
in its 2007 Maritime Military Strategy, recognises a direct 
link between national economic development and open 
sea routes.166  Brazil’s National Strategy of Defence167 
provides that: 
“Sea denial”, “sea control” and “power projection” should fo-
cus, without defining any hierarchy for the objectives, and 
according to the circumstances, on the following:
a) Proactive defence of the oil platforms;
b) Proactive defence of naval and port facilities, archipelagos 
and oceanic islands located within the Brazilian jurisdic-
tional waters;
c) Promptness to respond to any threat against sea-lanes 
of trade, by States, or by non-conventional or criminal 
forces;
d) Capacity to join international peacekeeping operations out-
side of the territory and the Brazilian jurisdictional waters, 
under the aegis of the United Nations or other multilat-
eral organizations in the region.
South Africa, as one example of a developing nation 
on the African continent, and considered to be the most 
powerful nation on the continent in military terms,168 
also considers its navy to be an important tool to secure 
free and safe passage for trade vessels and thereby to 
contribute towards regional stability. Approximately 98 
per cent of South Africa’s international trade moves by 
sea and the prosperity of the region is highly dependent 
on the stability and unhindered flow of trade into and out 
of the region.169  
In this context is noteworthy that Africa is now taking 
legal action “to liberate African coastal waters from age-
old foreign dominance, and take a significant step towards 
a more unified continent”170 and thus taking another 
significant step away from the remains of colonialism. 
The African Union has come up with an African Maritime 
Transport Charter (which still has to come into force)171 
and is about to conclude plans to establish an African 
Cabotage Regime, which will only allow African vessels to 
move cargo along the coast of the continent and prevent 
non-African mother vessels in African waters from using 
smaller vessels to move products back and forth in African 
waters. The aim is to support the African shipping industry 
by only allowing African owned vessels to trade along 
Africa’s coast.
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3.7. CLIMATE CHANGE AND WORLD 
 TRADE LAW
The international trade regime under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is also strongly related 
to the international climate change regime. In fact, both 
regimes recognise that climate change may provide 
opportunities as well as challenges for international 
development. The WTO is a remarkable example of 
institutional evolution and its dispute settlement system 
is as effective as it is impartial. However, similar to 
the international climate change negotiations, the so-
called Doha Development Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations have been complex and without success so 
far. Both negotiation processes seem to be lacking the 
necessary consensus of the parties involved. The only 
difference between the two negotiation processes lies in 
the fact that “the climate doesn’t have time for a Doha-
like approach”.172  Unfortunately, after more than 10 years 
of repeated negotiation failures, the Doha Development 
Round is unlikely to be concluded in the near future. 
Some even contend that the “WTO risks its future by 
keeping Doha alive”.173 
With regard to the persistence of global poverty and 
socio-economic inequalities, international trade rules 
often allow affluent countries to continue to protect their 
markets – with tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping duties, export 
credits and huge subsidies to domestic producers – at 
the expense of potential agricultural and textile exports 
from developing countries, for example,.174  International 
trade should therefore be considered as a means to an 
end, but not as the end in itself. An effective international 
trade regime must first and foremost be friendly to 
the environment, poverty reduction and sustainable 
development.175 The increasing awareness about the 
negative effects of climate change and the continuing 
communication among international institutions as well as 
the public dialogue necessarily lead to the rethinking and 
eventually to the adjustment of traditional frameworks. 
These also lead to fruitful discussions, for example, on 
new trade and climate change related measures, such as 
carbon labelling or similar standards or regulations on the 
imposition of border carbon adjustments, which impose 
border taxes on the embodied carbon of imported goods, 
set at the level of equivalent domestic taxes.176 
In the light of the fact that the global village, with 
international trade as a foundation, has become a reality, 
it is commendable that the ‘trade versus environment’ 
debate has shifted towards the concept of mutual 
supportiveness between trade and environment or trade 
and climate change respectively, even though it might – at 
first glance – appear to be a forced marriage.177 
Again, world trade law “can both constrain and enable 
climate action”.178  World trade law has the potential to 
promote community goals, namely the enhancement of 
economic development.179  A closer look at world trade 
law, however,
 
 sadly shows that accordingly solidarity is poorly imple-
mented. The flaw is not in WTO law itself: WTO law 
allows developed countries to act in favour of develop-
ing countries. But developed countries can choose not to 
implement relevant exceptions and too often implement 
them poorly.180 
Moreover, both the policy-making and academic 
communities have been focusing on the role of the 
WTO.181  There has been much discussion about the ways 
in which the WTO exerts a negative influence on climate 
law and policy. This includes its potential ‘chilling’ effect on 
the climate treaties, referring to the fact that parties to the 
climate regime have refrained from adopting multilateral 
trade measures – for instance, against non-compliers 
or non-parties.182  While WTO law may thus seem to 
constrain climate ambitions, attention has increasingly 
shifted to ways that the organisation might contribute 
to climate change mitigation. One of these options is 
pursuing the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies,183  as called 
for by the G20 in 2010.184
With the aim to achieve a global agreement to tackle 
aviation emissions, the European Union (EU) has since the 
beginning of 2012 included emissions from international 
aviation into the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS), 
which applies to EU and non-EU airlines alike.185 The 
recent independent action by the EU on international 
aviation emissions186 has given rise to a boiling international 
dispute whereby the EU has been accused of using 
unilateral trade measures and exercising extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in violation of international law,187  and failing 
to adequately reflect the principle of ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(CBDRRC) in the design of its aviation scheme.188
Similar opposition is to be expected if the EU applies 
measures to emissions from international shipping. These 
are estimated to be responsible for 2.7 per cent of the 
global CO2 emissions in 2007.189  Since the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) is struggling to agree 
upon global action on measures such as a levy on CO2 
emissions or a cap-and-trade scheme for curbing emissions 
from shipping, the European Commission is considering 
to including maritime transport emissions in the EU’s 
greenhouse gas reduction commitment.190  It becomes 
clear that powerful states can turn to unilateralism when 
they decide that they may achieve their foreign policy 
goals by unilateral action rather than by cooperation.191 
This in turn reflects that the international system is still 
23
characterised “by gross inequalities in power”.192 
While the question of response measures remains 
sensitive in UNFCCC negotiations, the forum could 
provide for a multilateral dialogue to examine the 
implications of unilateral climate action designed to 
promote the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC. In some 
cases, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism could 
also enter the scene if the measure in question falls under 
WTO Agreements. 
 
 In all cases, however, the focus should shift from the rela-
tively simplistic choice between multilateral action, uni-
lateral action or no action193  towards exploring ways in 
which interaction between a plural mix of legal regimes 
and jurisdictions in a global context can best serve the 
ultimate objective of the UNFCCC to avoid dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change.194  
Thus, more international cooperation in economic 
areas is necessary in order to ensure more coherence 
and global welfare.195  
 It is not surprising that given the broad scope of sub-
jects covered by international economic law in general 
and the law of the WTO in particular – cooperation in 
these fields show the variety of modes and mechanisms 
to implement obligations to cooperate.196  
After all, while world trade has – no doubt – contributed 
significantly to greenhouse gas emissions, it also offers 
a variety of options in terms of new technologies and 
services, which will be crucial in mitigating further climate 
change. 
Lastly, climate induced migration on the scale that is 
expected is not unlikely to have serious repercussions 
socially, economically and politically. In this sense, it is 
worth examining the implications such displacement may 
have for international trade.197  Some authors have started 
to approach international trade from an anti-capitalist 
perspective, linking trade to migration by arguing that the 
multilateral economic system is a capitalist one, whereby 
strong capitalist interests are protected by regulatory 
regimes such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
to continue exploiting the ecosystem in an unsustainable 
way in pursuit of profit. The environmental damage, in 
turn, leads to the displacement of people who are forced 
to migrate by the lack of resources and the basics for 
survival.198 
4. THE FUTURE WE WANT?
From the aforementioned it becomes clear that the existing regimes and intersections of law may not yet 
suffice to assure the best possible outcomes for future 
generations. This, among other things, was addressed 
at the 2012 Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable 
Development, which was the biggest UN conference 
ever. The conference should have been a major step 
forward in achieving a sustainable future – the future we 
want. This, however, did not happen due to a number of 
reasons, so that “the future we want” still needs further 
political attention and action.
The 2012 Club of Rome Report entitled “2052 – A 
Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years”,199  addresses 
several global goals as essential for the transition towards 
a sustainable, equitable and ‘happier’ world. Some of these 
global goals are also most relevant to the challenges of 
the Anthropocene: The report argues that societal values 
are essential for a sustainable and equitable society and 
that they must be fully reflected in all economic decisions. 
It further contends that a more equitable distribution of 
income both within and between countries is required. 
Moreover it holds that the ecology must be seen as a 
binding constraint for all forms of human activity and 
should therefore be managed in a manner which reflects 
its biophysical and economic value. Never should the 
world be in overshoot. Appropriate governance systems 
at a local, national and global level must be established to 
manage the transition into an equitable and sustainable 
global world.200 
In the light of the aforementioned the following sections 
will reflect in more detail on the way forward and make 
some recommendations for the future we (may or may 
not) want.
4.1 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL  
 INTEGRATION AND THE REDUCTION  
 OF POVERTY
The furtherance of economic development, regional integration, and the reduction of poverty go hand 
in hand.201  This interrelationship has become closer over 
the past few years due to increasing discussions in the 
world community on the issue, especially in the context of 
climate change. Yet, many regional integration processes 
around the world still face obstacles and challenges.202  The 
fear of losing state autonomy, the fear of losing national 
identity, socio-economic disparity among members, 
historical disagreement, lack of vision, and unwillingness 
to share resources are some of the obstacles that present 
themselves with regard to regional integration.203  Regional 
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integration provides an 
 
 opportunity to enhance political stability by establishing 
regional organisations, which play an increasing role (not 
only in the facilitation of trade but also) in defusing con-
flicts within and between countries and in promoting hu-
man rights. In terms of climate change related matters, 
such organisations are of the utmost relevance, espe-
cially when it comes to climate change related disaster 
management and environmentally induced migration. In 
this context, regional integration may serve as a tool to 
maintain political stability by building trust, enhancing un-
derstanding between groups and deepening interdepend-
ence.204
The triumph of market mechanisms has accelerated 
the process of globalisation. After the collapse of 
the competition between market-driven and state-
commanded economies, developing countries seem to 
have only one option to follow for modernisation and 
development. Liberal democracy does not seem to have 
any serious competitors. Given this monolithic economic 
and political framework, it is not an easy task to determine 
where sustainable economic development actually fits 
in.205  The same applies to the question regarding the 
relation between market, development and wellbeing, 
and the influence economic development can play on the 
alleviation of poverty in view of the fact that economic 
development is not always concomitant with greater 
welfare of the average individual, as the growth of the 
gross national product (GNP) is not a sufficient indicator 
with which to measure the level of security and the quality 
of life of people.
After all, it is a sad reality that about half of all human 
beings still live in severe poverty206 and about a quarter live 
in extreme or life-threatening poverty.  One major reason 
why poverty is still so prominent today is that “affluent 
societies are not merely helping too little, but also harming 
too much.”207  The principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR), one of the cornerstones of the 
international climate change regime, explicitly referred 
to in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, is meant 
to address this disparity. The trans-boundary nature of 
climate change action and impacts have environmental 
and developmental repercussions for all countries. The 
differentiation of responsibilities, however, should support 
even greater efforts in future,208  especially in view of the 
on-going “disparity between the human and the economic 
magnitude of world poverty” and “the enormous extent 
of economic inequality in the world today”.209  About 60 
per cent of the world’s population holds less than 2 per 
cent of global wealth, in contrast to the top 1 per cent of 
the world’s population, who hold 40 per cent of global 
wealth.210  “Because of these enormous inequalities, we 
are now at the point where the world is easily rich enough 
in aggregate to abolish all poverty. We are simply choosing 
to prioritize other ends instead.”211  Sustainable economic 
development therefore depends on equity: 
In the analysis of the causes of and solutions to climate 
change, the quality of the equity commons and the 
governance rules that protect and enhance it are key 
elements in crafting a viable international agreement on 
future emissions allocation and burden-sharing of emissions 
mitigation and climate adaptation costs. More broadly, 
equity – together with so many of the public goods that 
provide the foundation for […] sustainable development 
– is vulnerable. Deliberate policies in favour of increasing 
equity over time not only improve social welfare, but also 
act to shore up the foundations for the equity commons 
of the future, by establishing and strengthening rules for its 
governance.212
4.2 COOPERATIVE GLOBAL CLIMATE 
 GOVERNANCE
Although the problem of climate change is rather clear, political solutions are often far and unfair. 
The international community seems unable to come 
up with agreements that both remedy the substantive 
causes of climate change and the damage caused by 
it. An agreement that is optimal for the world and its 
future generations may not be optimal for some national 
economies, which would probably have to bear a large 
burden for significant domestic emissions reductions and 
which are not among the nation’s most gravely affected 
and threatened by climate change. The key remaining 
question is how responsibility for global climate protection 
can be shared more equitably in future. In order for that 
to happen more effective and equitable legal and policy 
responses need to be implemented.
We live in an increasingly interconnected and 
interdependent world. It is a world bound together, not 
just by state interests, but also – and especially in the 
context of climate change – by an interest in more global 
cooperation.213  It should thus be “in the interests of all 
States […] to uphold the rule of law in the world.”214 
Yet, it would be irrational to accept more powerful 
organs of world government, without a certain decrease 
of national government’s power.215  According to a 
minimal definition of cooperation the term could mean 
that states are to enter into contact with each other.216  It 
could further be argued that under general international 
law states are under an obligation to cooperate,217  an 
effort for instance “to accomplish an object by joint action, 
where the activity of a single state cannot achieve the 
same result”.218  Areas where international cooperation 
is essential include the international protection of human 
rights, the duty to cooperate in international economic 
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law and related areas, and the duty to cooperate in 
international dispute settlement.219 
On the one hand international duties to cooperate are 
based on treaties made by the sovereign states, which 
leaves it in their discretion whether they adhere to that 
treaty or not.220  On the other hand one can also argue 
that cooperation by states actually is “the most important 
manifestation of sovereignty”,221  rather than – “as was 
assumed in earlier times – an obstacle to international 
cooperation”.222  However, it must “be admitted that the 
hard law obligations to cooperate share the fate of other 
binding rules of international law, i.e. that some States still 
prefer not to comply” with them.223 
In the analysis of the causes of and solutions to climate 
change more “[d]eliberate policies in favour of increasing 
equity over time [would] not only improve social welfare, 
but would also act to shore up the foundations for 
the equity commons of the future, by establishing and 
strengthening rules for its governance”.224  Yet, in the 
development of international law it is so far “precipitate 
to consider solidarity as a legally binding principle for all in 
international law. All too often its content is too uncertain 
for it to work as an applicable legal norm.”225  
According to the UN General Assembly’s definition 
of solidarity in the UN Millennium Declaration “[g]lobal 
challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the 
costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles 
of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who 
benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most.”226 
Common but differentiated responsibilities as stipulated 
in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration states: “States shall 
cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, 
protect and restore the health and integrity of the earth’s 
ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities.”227 
International law as a value-based order should go 
beyond mere coexistence and involving the commonly 
shared interests of the international community.228 
Solidarity has long been invoked as a strong moral claim 
but it is more and more considered to be a “value 
reflected in international law”.229  Solidarity involves three 
different, not necessarily cumulative aspects:230 “The 
achievement of common objectives through common 
action of States, the achievement of common objectives 
through differentiated obligations of States and actions to 
benefit particular States”.231 
Yet, from the above it becomes clear that several 
independent international legal regimes exist, which are 
relevant in one way or another in the context of climate 
change. There are intersections between these regimes 
although they are fragmented. On the one hand such 
fragmentation and regulatory diversity may well be 
beneficial if the intersections of law are orchestrated in an 
innovative manner. On the other hand it is argued here 
that the law (at least as it exists today) is not enough 
to effectively address the challenges that accompany 
climate change. While there are some regimes dedicated 
exclusively to climate change (such as the UNFCCC), 
others impact deeply on climate change, yet have a 
primary focus dealing with quite different subjects (human 
rights, world trade, the oceans framework etc.). Dealing 
with climate change involves creating a coherent and 
orchestrated international regime, a set of arrangements 
among states and other stakeholders designed to solve 
a global problem that cannot be solved by individual 
nation-states. While the existing international regimes rest 
largely on intergovernmental agreement, one dealing with 
climate change will have to go far beyond the capacity 
of governments and will need support from non-state 
actors as well, creating a multi-stakeholder regime.232  For 
local and national action to be effective, such a global 
regime should aim at cooperation and solidarity, and be 
supportive and well designed. 
Human activities seem to be moving several of the 
Earth’s sub-systems outside the range of natural variability 
typical for the previous 500 000 years.233  Human societies 
therefore must now change course and steer away from 
critical tipping points in the Earth system that might lead 
to rapid and irreversible change.234 
 
 This requires fundamental reorientation and restructuring 
of national and international institutions toward more ef-
fective Earth system governance and planetary steward-
ship […]. The world saw a major transformative shift in 
governance after 1945 that led to the establishment of 
the UN and numerous other international organizations, 
along with far-reaching new international legal norms on 
human rights and economic cooperation. We need simi-
lar changes today, a ‘constitutional moment’ in world poli-
tics and global governance.235  
At the same time international law and global governance 
will require more empowerment of international judicial 
institutions that learn to integrate inter-disciplinary tools 
to accommodate the inter-linkages between legal and 
institutional reforms and climate change policy.
5. CONCLUSION
To conclude with a statement made by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in February 2013: 
“We live in an age of monumental transition – economic, 
demographic, political. Global interdependence is 
deepening. Transnational threats are growing. This 
means we must make better use of the United Nations 
machinery.”  So far, however,236 
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 the climate change regime complex is a loosely coupled 
system of institutions; it has no clear hierarchy or core, yet 
many of its elements are linked in complementary ways. 
It occupies neither extreme. Instead, it is a regime com-
plex whose elements are loosely linked to one another, 
between the poles of integration and fragmentation.237 
In the threatening context of climate change this can 
be interpreted as a failure of the system: More coherent, 
cooperative, collective action is needed to address 
climate change. The piecemeal, fragmentary approach to 
both understanding and addressing the issue of climate 
change is unsatisfactory. Humanity has the opportunities, 
tools, science, technology and insight to deal with climate 
change and to move into a better world. Whether we 
manage to do so will depend on improved mechanisms 
of international law and governance. The failure to bring 
international relations under the rule of law through 
the absence of more effective central mechanisms of 
adjudication and/or enforcement explains the pervasive 
ambiguity of international law.238 In fact, what is missing is 
more world government, a strengthening of the central 
organs of the United Nations, for example, that would 
make it more likely that international law will be applied 
and enforced.  
Legitimate voices240  have been aired regarding the need 
of a specialised international judicial body to hear and 
determine trans-boundary environmental matters and to 
provide greater coherence to the fragmented global climate 
governance regime. Such a judicial body could provide 
interpretive guidance and judicial support, which in turn 
would – no doubt – also be of benefit when combating 
climate change. It could thus contribute to coordination 
of the intersections of law, to legal harmonisation and to a 
complementation of existing fragmented climate relevant 
regimes.
Such a judicial body would also be in line with Article 
14 of the UNFCCC (dispute resolution) and particularly 
Article 33(1) of the UN Charter:
 
 The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is 
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace 
and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotia-
tion, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice.
It could resolve conflicting international law obligations 
and overlapping mandates of the global climate governance 
structures; create a model for compliance and enforcement 
to encourage national protection standards; and promote 
greater accountability and access to justice.
Lastly, existing intersections of law and more cooperative 
global climate governance can “develop an unforeseen 
dynamism, in particular if […] endowed with institutions of 
a norm-setting and also of a judicial character”.241  However, 
the law only enfolds “effective force from the underlying 
political consensus. Without such consensus, legal devices, 
no matter how scrupulously they have been thought 
out, may be swept away by the ground forces active in 
international society”.242  
The threats of the very existence of humanity are obvious: 
In this respect, in no area of law should the common 
interests of mankind be clearer than when addressing 
climate change and the challenges in the Anthropocene. 
With this in mind one should reasonably think that it is 
possible to identify and agree upon the necessary reforms 
in response to the changing climate and for the survival of 
mankind.
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